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Abstract  
 This paper investigates impact of shareholder activism on corporate 
governance in China. The separation of ownership and management of 
companies often to some extent causes agency problems between 
shareholders and company managers. In Western countries, shareholders of a 
company usually actively participate in the company’s management and 
closely monitor management issues in order to enhance the company’s 
performance. At present, China’s securities market, along with institutional 
investors, is undergoing a rapid development. Nevertheless, problems in 
corporate governance among listed companies have been hindering the 
development of capital markets in China. Meanwhile, institutional investors 
have experienced significant growth. Moreover, national policies, as well as 
the split-share structure reform, further encourage the growth of institutional 
investors and their active participation in corporate governance for further 
promotion of the development of capital markets. Making empirical 
contribution, this paper tests how effective institutional investors participate 
in the governance of listed companies on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
(SZSE) “A” Shares after share reform in China. Results of empirical 
estimation indicate that China’s institutional investors do participate in 
corporate governance, but only to some extent. Positive behaviors of Chinese 
shareholders have played a favorable role in improving corporate 
governance. 
 
Keywords: Shareholder Activism; Institutional Investors; Corporate 
Governance 
 
Introduction 
 Until the 1980s, institutional investors had no right to speak due to 
their small size in the market in Western countries, especially in America’s 
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capital markets. Institutional investors then often became negative 
shareholders in listed companies. Only when they were dissatisfied with the 
business decision and corporate governance would they adopt the method of 
“voting with feet”, i.e., selling holdings to protect their own interests. At that 
time, the main purpose of institutional investors in the capital market is 
speculation. However, since the 1980s, the scale and the number of 
institutional investors have both grown exponentially. Institutional investors 
began replacing their past passive roles of speculators with long-term 
investors who pay more attention to the real value. Institutional investors of a 
company focus their attention on the company’s performance for the purpose 
of improving and protecting the interests of minority shareholders. Positive 
behaviors of institutional investors have gradually become a norm in 
corporate governance mechanism. At the same time, institutional investors 
have become the backbone of the capital market. 
 Institutional investors change the ownership structure thoroughly 
because the number of the institutional investors is large. They have positive 
effect because they would put pressure to the board of directors and 
supervise managers to improve the performance of corporate governance. 
For this reason, they constitute into an important force to improve the 
traditional corporate governance, and to promote the fundamental change of 
corporate governance structure. The growth of institutional investors and the 
expansion of their influence indicate that the country’s financial structure 
enter into a new stage of development. From the experience of developed 
countries, institutional investors encourage competition in the financial 
system, and improve the efficiency of the financial system and capital 
market. Market which dominated by institutional investors has the most 
comprehensive financial markets function. Also it is the significant way for 
developing market to evolve their financial market. The development of the 
institutional investors have large influence and promotion for emerging 
market countries whose capital market is dominated by banks because it 
could optimize the financial structure and improve the efficiency of the 
financial system and capital market. 
 China’s capital markets began in the 1990s. So far it has only taken 
China 20 years to develop its capital market. However, the speed of its 
development has grown rapidly which make people impressive. At the same 
time, institutional investors enter into China’s capital market which grows 
together with capital market. Institutional investors in China which have 
developed rapidly have begun to take shape, but they still could not have 
desired effect on capital market which already has a lot of problems that 
need to be solved. Since 2005, the stock market institutional investors such 
as securities investment funds, qualified foreign institutional investors 
(QFII), the national social security fund and fund of insurance have formed 
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the diversified shape. Particularly, the reform of non-tradable shares starts in 
2005 and it can effectively solve the problems about the market structure, 
eliminate the difference between non-tradable shares and tradable shares and 
realized the purpose “same share same right” which means realizing the 
balance of interests. At the same time, it also provides the opportunity for 
institutional investors to participate in corporate governance. 
 The main aim for Chinese institutional investors is to make use of the 
function of institutional investor to improve corporate governance. However, 
the history for the development of Chinese institutional investor is too short 
to reach the goal. 
 Research on the effects of corporate governance and performance of 
listed companies have reached the deep point. Actually, the related theory 
about institutional investor is increasingly mature. Nevertheless, domestic 
researchers started to find this issue late. Research on shareholder activism 
and its impact on corporate governance in China is scanty. At present, the 
domestic research on corporate governance focused on internal governance. 
And for external governance, researchers mainly concentrated on the market 
for corporate control. The problem is that studies of institutional investors 
governance is not enough, especially for institutional investors in corporate 
governance. With the rapid growth of the type and size of Chinese 
institutional investors, how to make institutional investors play a positive 
role in improving the corporate governance of listed companies in China has 
become a realistic urgent need of research topic. 
 The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows. In section 
two we provide definition of the relevant concepts. We summarize previous 
research and various definitions of these concepts. In section three, related 
literature is provided which contain about some previous research on 
corporate governance. Section four describes our data, variables and 
descriptive statistics of variables. In section five we develop a model that 
considers the effect of institutional investors on corporate governance. 
Section four describes the construction of our sample of shareholding of 
institutional investment to analyze the impact of institutional investors on 
corporate governance. In the next two sections we specify our empirical 
framework, summarize our main results, and describe how our estimates on 
the institutional investors. The final section concludes. 
 
Definition of Relevant Concepts 
 The definition of corporate governance, shareholder activism, and 
institutional investors are given below. 
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Definition of Corporate Governance 
 Corporate governance is defined as the frame of rules, relationships, 
systems and processes within and by which authority is practiced and 
controlled in corporations (ASX 2010, P3). Additionally, Corporate 
governance is the segmentation of the owner’ power and its aim is to set up 
the theory to achieve responsibility between shareholders and the other 
department of the company (McManus and White, 2008). As a matter of 
fact, corporate governance affects the measures the company takes to set and 
realize its goals, manage the risks, and maximize the performance (ASX 
2010). McManus and White (2008) points out that corporate governance 
could do great contribution to the company when managers direct day-to-day 
operations to achieve the goals and to maximize stakeholders’ interest.  
 
Definition of Shareholder Activism 
 Shareholder activism has not been defined in a unified, rigorous 
academic way.  Most scholars use the concept of “shareholder activism” and 
the “shareholder activism” in conventional way which leads to a variety of 
descriptive explanation. Jamie (2005) points out that “shareholder activism” 
could help small and medium-sized shareholders to take all action to 
improve corporate governance structure, to enhance the value of the 
company and to ensure that all shareholders would be treated fairly. This 
paper argues that the “shareholder activism” refers to the behavior that 
institutional shareholders participating in corporate governance actively. In 
order to improve the condition of corporate governance and the company’s 
performance, shareholder activism has become the important part. In 
addition, Hirschman (1971) support Jamie (2005) about the signification on 
shareholder activism. And when institutional shareholders are not satisfied 
with corporate governance, they would usually adopt three strategies: (1) 
exit, sell their shares, also known as “voting with their feet”; (2) speak, 
continue to hold the stock, and expressed dissatisfaction, which put pressure 
on the manager in many ways to reach corporate governance goal and strive 
to improve the return on investment; (3) loyalty, which means to continue to 
hold the stock. Shareholder activism is the strategy of “speak”. 
 
Definition of Institutional Investors 
 Academic definition of institutional investors can be also divided into 
two different senses. Generalized institutional investors include not only the 
securities investment funds, pension funds (the social security fund, etc.), 
insurance companies, but also several kinds of securities intermediary 
institutions, foundation of private donations, social charity organizations. 
From the narrow sense, institutional investors refer to different kinds of 
securities investment funds, pension funds and insurance companies. In this 
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paper, we treat the institutional investors as the organization which would be 
entrusted by the customers who have massive funds including securities 
investment funds, investment companies, trust investment companies, 
insurance companies, savings bank, QFII. However, the QFII investment 
philosophy, strategy, management system and other aspects is different with 
the domestic institutional investors. This paper would focus on the securities 
investment funds, pension funds and insurance companies to represent 
institutional investors. 
 
Related Literature 
 Previous research on institutional investors participating in corporate 
governance both normative studies, empirical research, generally focused on 
the following aspects.  
 
The Influence Factors  
 Crossman and Hart (1980), Huddart (1993), Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) have commended that company holding shares in the larger 
proportion have a stronger incentive to monitor management because their 
regulatory activities will earn far more than they would have to pay. 
Therefore, shareholders who have higher proportion of the company shares 
could have higher impact on corporate decisions. Carleton et al. (1998) also 
puts forward that improvement of shareholding requires institutional investor 
to act in corporate governance which is a particularly important driving 
factor. In the process of institutional investors participating in corporate 
governance, there is information asymmetry problem between them and 
managers and the free-rider problem resulting from small and medium-sized 
shareholders (Crossman and Hart, 1980; Davis, 2002). Through the analysis 
about institutional investors participating in corporate governance in 
Australia and the UK, Stapledon (1996) finds that institutional investors 
participating in corporate governance does give a certain benefits to the 
company. At the same time, the empirical results also show that institutional 
investors in the United States in recent years also actively involved in the 
corporate governance, and the activism can improve the performance of the 
company (Gillan and Starks, 1998). After studying a large number of UK 
companies, Filatotchev and Dotsenko (2013) concludes that the effectiveness 
of institutional investors in corporate governance depends greatly on the 
types of investors and their basic requirement. 
 
The Way of Institutional Investors for Participation 
 Usually, the way of institutional investors participating in corporate 
governance includes use voting rights positively in routine meeting, voting 
competition authority, privately negotiation, putting forward shareholder 
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proposal, supervising target companies. Several researches have focus on 
this problem. Grundfest (1990) argues that the way the institutional investors 
get involved in have been changed from negotiation and quarrel to voting for 
the decision, regular discussion, even including nominating managers, voting 
for a seat on the board through the general meeting of shareholders. Drucker 
(1991) argues that institutional investors who get involved corporate 
governance are purposed to standardize the board of directors, rather than 
intervene in the company. Only the board of directors represents the interests 
of the owners and be responsible to the shareholders could they be efficient. 
Paul and Bernard (2015) argue that institutional investors should approach 
by persuading the board or other shareholders to getting the target effect, 
which allows them to share the rights to perform. 
 
The Effect of Institutional Investors for Participation 
 The effect of institutional investors participating in corporate 
governance is one of the most debated and controversial arguments among 
the theory researches. At present, the theoretical circle has developed two 
unique ideas of the corporate governance. The first one is that institutional 
investors participating in corporate governance has a positive effect on 
corporate governance. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) argue that the existence of 
institutional shareholders can reduce equity dispersion which caused by the 
“free rider” problem and can strengthen internal supervision mechanism. 
Chaganti (1991) uses return on assets (ROA) to present corporate 
performance. And his empirical research results show that the scale of 
institutional ownership has a significant correlation with the company’s 
performance. Chidambaran and John (1998) argues that institutional 
investors such as shareholders are convenient to get inside information about 
the company’s management from the inside company. It solves the 
information asymmetry problem between shareholders and the managers, 
which also enhance the transparency of the company and strengthen the 
supervision of the enterprise. 
 Another kind of option is that institutional shareholder has a negative 
effect on corporate governance. Coffee (1991) argues that institutional 
investors’ supervision is not absolute advantage. Institutional investors 
mostly adopt diversification strategy because supervision is the nature of the 
liquidity and short-term behavior. Barnard (1992) argues that top managers 
have bad evaluation of institutional investors, or even hostile to its existence, 
which blocks the beneficial effects of the institutional investors. Karpoff 
(1996) even argues that those bills launched by institutional shareholders 
cannot lead to a suitable decision which can improve the performance of the 
company. There is no evidence that can prove that these bills can change its 
policies, improve the corporate performance, and increase the value of the 
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company. Webb (2003) argues that institutional investors mostly focused on 
short-term performance index of the company. If institutional investors get 
involved in corporate governance and pressure the management pressure, it 
is easy to make the management have hostility and cause the various 
problems of company management. The goal of institutional investors and 
the company is different. The company managers make their effort to 
maximize the value of deviation. Institutional investors have no management 
enterprise’s experience and ability comparing with the managers. Lack of 
professional ability would lead to worse corporate governance or give a 
negative impact on company. Nelson and Peterson (2004) use empirical 
method for target companies who have been selected in CII list. The results 
show that institutional shareholders have no significant effect on corporate 
performance although these behaviors have changed the company 
governance structure. 
 
Data 
 This paper  selects listed companies on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
(SZSE) “A” Shares after share reform in China. The data are gathered from 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) spanning from 2007 to 2014. The data set 
includes 468 listed companies on “A” shares. Companies on “B” shares are 
of small scales and therefore not considered. Among the 468 listed 
companies on “A” shares, financial companies lack comparable financial 
indicators, and companies under special treatment have ambiguous factors. 
Those companies are also removed. The panel data for empirical estimation 
consists of 402 companies across 8 years.  
 
Description of Variables 
 Considering the large number of determining factors on corporate 
governance, the paper includes as many explanatory variables as possible in 
empirical estimation. Main variables are described below: 
 Earnings Per Share (EPS): EPS is the ratio of the net profit in one 
year to the total number of outstanding common shares. This ratio clearly 
reflects the net profit created by one share. It is one of the most important 
measurable indicators. 
 Return On Assets (ROA): ROA is the ratio of the net profit to the 
average total assets. 
 Shareholding of Institutional Investors (INS): INS is the parameter of 
interest. Institutional investors generally hold a considerable number of 
shares of listed companies, so they will be more willing to monitor and 
influence company management. 
 Shareholding of Largest Shareholder (TOP1): previous research 
argues that shareholding of the largest shareholder has significant influence 
European Scientific Journal January 2016 edition vol.12, No.1  ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
  
 
121 
on corporate governance, and this influence is not linear, but in the U-shaped 
format. Therefore, the paper selects this variable and tests the influence of 
the largest shareholders on corporate governance. 
 Company Size (SIZE): company size has an important influence on 
corporate governance. In theory, the larger the company size is, the better its 
performance will be. However, the emergence of issues involving corporate 
governance, such as principal-agent problems, makes the relation between 
the two ambiguous. So the paper tests the effect of the company size on 
corporate governance. We select the natural logarithm of total assets at year 
end as the indicator of the company size. 
 Financial Risk (LEV): the paper selects asset-liability ratio to 
measure the financial risk of listed companies. It is the ratio of the total 
liabilities to the total assets at year end. 
 Corporate Growth Ability (GROWTH): corporate growth ability 
directly affects the performance of listed companies. Usually, the stronger 
the corporate growth ability is, the larger the profit space is, and the better its 
performance will be. A great deal of existing literature generally measures 
the corporate growth ability by revenue growth rate. The reason is that the 
index not only evaluates the change of the company’s market share, but also 
the index predicts the growth of the company’s business. Corporate growth 
ability is calculated as the ratio of the added value of operating revenue this 
year to the operating revenue last year. 
 Total Assets Turnover (TURN): TURN is an important indicator to 
evaluate operating quality and efficiency of all company assets. It is the ratio 
of the company’s net operating revenue to the average total assets. 
Generally, the faster the turnover is, the stronger sales ability is, and the 
better its performance will be. 
 The Proportion of Circulating Shares (RTS): RTS is the ratio of 
circulating shares to total number of shares of listed companies. After 
completion of share reform in 2007, most listed companies’ shares are 
circulating. 
 
Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
Descriptive statistics of each variable are shown in Table 2. 
Table 2 Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
Variables Obs Mean SD Min Max 
EPS 3216 0.2798953 0.5562205 -4.21 10.51 
ROA 3216 0.05720011 8.529129 -0.975715 1.152224 
INS 3216 0.1947788 19.61441 0 0.882359 
SIZE 3216 21.90575 1.330124 15.57726 26.95455 
GROWTH 3216 0.8029416 2685.531 -0.984336 1497.156 
LEV 3216 0.5203162 20.19129 0.00707988 1.273508 
TURN 3216 0.7544149 0.7095799 0.0007 8.5009 
TOP1 3216 0.3431174 15.71057 0.0362109 0.8940855 
RTS 3216 0.9910402 6.948079 0.2656042 1 
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 It can be seen from Table 2 that the biggest INS is 88.24%, with the 
average being only 19.48%. It shows that development of institutional 
investors in capital market is rapid, but the overall shareholding is still low. 
The minimum of INS is 0, which indicates that there are still some listed 
companies whose stock value is low, and it is difficult to forecast their future 
return. The maximum of TOP1 is 89.41%, the average is 34.31%, and the 
minimum is 3.62%, which shows that TOP1 of some listed companies is 
higher. Given that Chinese institutional investors are not mature enough, “a 
dominant” problem may still exist, which to a certain extent, restricts the 
interests of other shareholders. The average of RTS is 99.1%. It indicates 
that after the share reform, most of the issued shares of listed companies are 
circulating shares, which greatly enhances the willingness of institutional 
investors to participate in corporate governance. Meanwhile, it is conducive 
to the healthy development of the capital market in China. 
 
Empirical Analysis  
 Not only can institutional investors improve the equity restriction of 
listed companies and effectively supervise the behavior of majority 
shareholders who can encroach on the interests of minority shareholders, but 
also they can enhance corporate performance by actively participating in 
corporate governance. In addition, institutional investors compete for control 
rights, which to a certain extent, effectively check and balance the other 
majority shareholders. Meanwhile, this will maximize investors’ return. The 
increase of institutional investors’ shareholding makes their interests closely 
relate to the target company. Institutional investors are more willing to invest 
for the long term and actively participate in corporate governance. This will 
have a certain influence on corporate governance. Therefore, this paper puts 
forward the following hypothesises: 
 HA : Institutional investors can improve corporate governance, i.e., 
shareholding of institutional investors is positively related to corporate 
governance.  
 HB : Institutional investors cannot improve corporate governance, i.e., 
shareholding of institutional investors is negatively or no related to corporate 
governance.     
 
Econometric Model 
 Corporate governance is proxied by both EPS and ROA. Shareholder 
activism is proxied by INS. The paper sets the EPS and ROA as dependent 
variables respectively, INS as the parameter of interest, then runs regressions 
to investigate whether shareholding of institutional investors has an influence 
on corporate governance after controlling the effect of relevant factors. The 
form of panel data model is: 
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where α  is the intercept, iβ （i=1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8）are the parameter 
coefficients and ε  is the error term. 
 
Empirical Results 
 First of all, to avoid spurious regression and ensure the validity of the 
estimation results, this paper performs stationary test on variable EPS and 
ROA. Results of unit root test indicate that these two variables are both 
stationary. Besides, correlation analysis finds that there is no 
multicollinearity among independent variables. In addition, Hausman test is 
performed to choose between fixed effect and random effect. The result is in 
favor of fixed effect model. F test is conducted to choose between fixed 
effect and ordinary least squares (OLS). The result indicates that fixed effect 
model is optimal. Thus, the panel estimation model with fixed effect model 
is adopted. 
 Regression results are shown in Table 3 and Table 4. Regression 1 is 
the Pooled OLS, Regression 2 is the robust Pooled OLS that accounts for 
heteroskedasticity, Regression 3 is the incremental Pooled OLS, Regression 
4 is the fixed effect, Regression 5 is the fixed effect with eliminating the 
heteroskedasticity, and Regression 6 is the incremental fixed effect. Due to 
the existence of heteroskedasticity, Regression 5 of Table 3 is optimal for 
results of EPS. All variables in Regression 6 are significant, so Regression 6 
of Table 4 is optimal for results of ROA. 
Table 3 Regression Results (EPS as dependent variable) 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent Variable: EPS 
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 Regression 5 Regression 6 
Coef. 
（S. E.） 
Coef. 
（S. E.） 
Coef. 
（S. E.） 
Coef. 
（S. E.） 
Coef. 
（S. E.） 
Coef. 
（S. E.） 
INS .0037937*** (.0004458) 
.0037937*** 
(.0004087) 
.0037937*** 
(.0008028) 
.0014004*** 
(.0005411) 
.0014004**  
(.0006046) 
.0014004*** 
(.0002583) 
SIZE .1710447*** (.0071242) 
.1710447*** 
(.009085) 
.1710447*** 
(.0056254) 
.1692066*** 
(.014267) 
.1692066***  
(.0261776) 
.1692066*** 
(.0186367) 
GROWTH -3.44e-07   (3.21e-06) 
-3.44e-07   
(1.02e-06) 
-3.44e-07   
(7.09e-07) 
8.33e-07   
(2.75e-06) 
8.33e-07   
(6.18e-07) 
8.33e-07   
(4.63e-07) 
LEV 
-
.0065484*** 
(.000452) 
-
.0065484*** 
(.0005375) 
-
.0065484*** 
(.0003126) 
-
.0090382*** 
(.0007217) 
-
.0090382*** 
(.0016212) 
-
.0090382***   
(.0010939) 
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Table 4 Regression Results (ROA as dependent variable) 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent Variable: ROA 
Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 2 Regression 4 Regression 5 Regression 6 
Coef. 
（S. E.） 
Coef. 
（S. E.） 
Coef. 
（S. E.） 
Coef. 
（S. E.） 
Coef. 
（S. E.） 
Coef. 
（S. E.） 
INS .0288726*** (.0071388) 
.0288726***   
(.0070849) 
.0288726*** 
(.0033524) 
.0232404** 
(.0093342) 
.0232404** 
(.0113758) 
.0232404* 
(.0102203) 
SIZE 1.494593*** (.1140704) 
1.494593***   
(.1601742) 
1.494593***  
(.2057385) 
1.501777***    
(.2461) 
1.501777*** 
(.4509296) 
1.501777*** 
(.4048337) 
GROWTH .0000804 (.0000514) 
.0000804***   
(.0000136) 
.0000804***   
(6.78e-06) 
.0000929** 
(.0000474) 
.0000929*** 
(.0000175) 
.0000929*** 
(.0000175) 
LEV 
-
.1267154*** 
(.0072369) 
-
.1267154***   
(.0103858) 
-
.1267154*** 
(.0069568) 
-
.1704906*** 
(.0124494) 
-
.1704906*** 
(.0292926) 
-
.1704906***   
(.0267963) 
TURN 1.667978*** (.1962797) 
1.667978***   
(.2045462) 
1.667978***  
(.3031404) 
4.377214*** 
(.4528526) 
4.377214*** 
(.9964398) 
4.377214*** 
(.3555319) 
TOP1 .0800338** (.0377001) 
.0800338**   
(.0355248) 
.0800338***  
(.0137965) 
-.1651341**   
(.0782668) 
-.1651341 
(.1255882) 
-
.1651341***   
(.0422316) 
TOP1SQR -.0006052 (.0004633) 
-.0006052   
(.0004238) 
-
.0006052*** 
(.00015) 
.0028412*** 
(.0009034) 
.0028412**  
(.00135) 
.0028412***    
(.000619) 
RTS -.0116494 (.0201105) 
-.0116494   
(.0311051) 
-.0116494 
(.0091612) 
-.057352** 
(.0230784) 
-.057352 
(.0402788) 
-.057352*** 
(.0158793) 
CONSTANT 
-
22.98301***    
(2.98754) 
-
22.98301***   
(4.278215) 
-
22.98301***   
(4.237471) 
-14.76444**   
(5.897682) 
-14.76444   
(10.50415) 
-14.76444**   
(6.227204) 
Adj.R-sq 0.1318 0.1339 0.1339 0.1134 0.1134 0.1028 
Note: *, ** and *** indicate rejection of the null hypothesis at 1%, 5% and 10% level of 
significance, respectively. 
 The results of two tables show similar impacts on dependent 
variables. As shown in Regression 5 of Table 3, INS is positively 
TURN .0884606*** (.0122586) 
.0884606*** 
(.012625) 
.0884606*** 
(.0107139) 
.2219468*** 
(.026253) 
.2219468***  
(.0527162) 
.2219468*** 
(.0262576) 
TOP1 .0054539** (.0023545) 
.0054539** 
(.0023702) 
.0054539** 
(.0022466) 
-.0102117** 
(.0045373) 
-.0102117* 
(.0057756) 
-.0102117**   
(.0039383) 
TOP1SQR -.0000614** (.0000289) 
-.0000614** 
(.0000286) 
-.0000614** 
(.0000257) 
.0001786*** 
(.0000524) 
.0001786*** 
(.0000678) 
.0001786** 
(.0000539) 
RTS .000025  (.001256) 
.000025 
(.0011904) 
.000025 
(.0011029) 
-.0007145 
(.0013379) 
-.0007145 
(.001517) 
-.0007145   
(.0008977) 
CONSTANT -3.36892*** (.1865858) 
-3.36892*** 
(.207278) 
-3.36892*** 
(.2033428) 
-
2.984258*** 
(.3419037) 
-
2.984258*** 
(.548249) 
-
2.984258***   
(.3192304) 
Adj.R-sq 0.2038 0.2057 0.2057 0.1671 0.1671 0.1134 
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significant at the 5% level. Coefficient of the variable INS is 0.0014004, 
which means a 1% increase of INS is estimated to increase EPS by 
0.14004% in fixed effect model. Shareholding of institutional investors 
improves the degree of their willingness to participate in corporate 
governance. Compared to individual investors, institutional investors 
have superiority in size and decision to effectively supervise the 
management. This finally reflects in the increase of stock value. 
According to Regression 6 of Table 4, INS is also positively significant 
at the 10% level. Coefficient of the variable INS is 0.0232404, which 
means a 1% increase of INS is associated with a 0.232404% increase of 
ROA in fixed effect model. So shareholding of institutional investors can 
improve the corporate governance. Therefore, SIZE and TURN present a 
notable positive correlation with EPS and ROA. The bigger the company 
size is, the faster its turnover is, and the better its performance will be. 
 From what has been discussed above, it is evident that 
shareholding of institutional investors is positively correlated with the 
performance of corporate governance, which complies with assumption 
A. So we fail to reject the assumption A. 
 
Conclusion and Policy Implications 
 Compared to China, shareholding of institutional investors in the 
west is higher and the holding period is long. They have the motivation 
to participate in corporate governance, in the long run, will increase the 
value of listed companies. According to the previous research in 
America, significance of institutional investors’ positive behaviors is not 
substitution but cooperation, i.e., institutional investors do not want to 
substitute for managers or weaken managers’ authority, but to seek the 
cooperation between internal control and external control mechanism. 
Not only do the positive behaviors of institutional investors increase their 
own interests, but also improve the operating performance of listed 
companies. Rose and Sharfman (2015) also argues that shareholder 
activism can be beneficial to the enterprise. Therefore, shareholders, 
board of directors and regulators should pay more attention to the status 
of shareholder activism in business decisions. 
 The mechanism of Chinese institutional investors participating in 
corporate governance is still immature. A long time ago, due to the fact 
that Chinese listed companies are often in the control of large 
shareholders and executives, minority shareholders only focus on the 
volatility of stock prices in secondary market and never get a greater 
discourse power in corporate governance. This is the most evident before 
the reform of the shareholder structure. At that time, board lacks of 
independence and effectiveness, and management lacks a long-term 
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incentive mechanism. However, with the opening of the Chinese capital 
market, institutional shareholders are likely to become active 
shareholders. Based on previous research, this paper takes into account of 
the actual situation. By choosing the shareholding of institutional 
investors as the measurement of shareholder activism and the data after 
the share reform of listed companies in 2007 which can eliminate the 
influence of non-tradable shares on shareholders of listed companies, 
empirical results finds that positive behaviors of Chinese shareholders 
have played a favorable role in improving corporate governance. The 
following suggestions are put forward based on empirical results. 
 First, to some extent, Chinese institutional investors have certain 
insignificant influence on corporate governance. This may be related to 
the lower shareholding of institutional investors and existing more 
serious “short-sighted” and “herd behavior” between institutional 
investors. This leads to the problem that shareholding of institutional 
investors such as securities investment funds cannot restrict to the 
management and offer substantial comment on corporate decisions. 
 Second, given growing trend of the Chinese and international 
securities markets, it is imperative to increase the proportion of tradable 
shares and develop long-term institutional investors. At present, main 
institutional investors in China are securities funds whose primary 
investors are small and medium-sized retail investors. Due to the fact that 
small investors’ goals are short-term, this causes the investment 
objectives of the securities funds to be short-term as well. Therefore, 
securities investment funds in China, in fact, only have the nature of 
speculation. 
 Third, to promote further development of institutional investors, 
relevant laws and regulations should be established and improved, 
especially about corporate governance. In order to provide institutional 
conditions for institutional investors to play a leading role in listed 
companies, we should legislate to broaden the limit of shareholding in 
one listed company. For instance, strengthen the supervision of securities 
investment funds, increase their speculative cost, and establish an 
effective supervision system. Besides, government agencies should 
appropriately limit the liquidity of institutional investors’ assets to reduce 
the asset turnover rate, and foster them to be the backbone of the market 
stability. 
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